It is often argued that if the substitutability between workers is sufficiently high, labour is better off under a centralised labour union than under decentralised unions. We show that this may not be the case in an open economy with foreign direct investment as the incentive for outward FDI is higher under a centralised union than under decentralised unions. If the number of firms undertaking FDI under a centralised union is higher than under decentralised unions, their wage rates charged by the labour union and the union utility may be higher under decentralised unions than under a centralised union, and the comparison may depend on the competitiveness of the industry. We also show that there are situations where both the domestic industry and the labour unions prefer decentralised unions over a centralised union.
Introduction
Labour markets differ substantially between countries with respect to the degree of centralised wage setting (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988 , Moene and Wallerstein, 1997 , Flanagan, 1999 and Wallerstein, 1999 . A decentralised wage setting is often contrasted with a centralised wage setting.
1 While the centralised wage setting is egalitarian in nature and generally makes the workers better off if the workforce consists of sufficiently substitutable workers (Horn and Wolinsky, 1988 and Davidson, 1988) , 2 it is commonly believed that the rigidity associated with this system is generally bad for overall economic performance (Nickell, 1997 and Siebert, 1997) .
While the existing theoretical literature is showing the relationship between unionisation structure and the union utility in closed economies, the overwhelming growth of foreign direct investment (FDI) in recent decades makes it important to analyse this issue from an open economy perspective. With this background and motivated by the institutional diversity of unionisation structure and the significant growth of FDI in recent decades, this paper examines the relationship between unionisation structure and utility of the unions in an international oligopoly.
We consider an economy where the firms from a home (or domestic) country and a foreign country compete in the foreign country market. The firms in the home country 1 may serve the foreign country either through exports or FDI. The labour market in the home country is unionised, whereas the foreign labour market is perfectly competitive.
We show that the incentive for outward FDI by the home firms is higher under a centralised labour union than under decentralised labour unions. Whether the wage rate charged by the labour unions and the union utility are higher under a centralised union is ambiguous. If all home firms serve the foreign country market through exports irrespective of the unionisation structure, their wage rates charged by the labour union and the union utility are higher under a centralised union than under decentralised unions.
However, the wage rate charged by the labour union and the union utility may be higher under decentralised unions if, in equilibrium, the number of firms undertaking FDI is higher under a centralised union than under decentralised unions, and the comparison may depend on the competitiveness of the industry. Using an example, we show that if the difference between the number of firms undertaking FDI under a centralised and decentralised unions is not very large, the union utility is higher under a centralised (decentralised) union if the industry is sufficiently (not sufficiently) competitive.
If the home firms undertake outward FDI, there is a loss of demand for labour in the home country, which tends to reduce the wage rate in the home country and may also be detrimental to the union utility. Since the incentive for FDI is higher under a centralised union, this negative effect is more likely to be higher under a centralised union than under decentralised unions. However, a centralised union, by internalising competition between separate unions, helps to raise the wage rate, thus providing a positive effect on the union utility. The negative effect of a centralised union is more likely to dominate the positive effect provided the difference between the numbers of 2 firms undertaking FDI under a centralised union is sufficiently larger than under decentralised unions.
We also show that if no home firm undertakes FDI irrespective of the unionisation structure, there is a conflict of interests between the domestic industry and the labour union, since the former prefers a decentralised unionisation structure, while the latter prefers a centralised unionisation structure. However, this conflict may not arise if there is more FDI under a centralised union than under decentralised unions.
The present paper has a clear relevance in the contemporary world which shows that the Western European countries, where the labour unions are generally highly centralised, are being the world's major foreign direct investors over the past few decades. UNCTAD (2006) shows that, since 1980, the EU has always been the major world investor experiencing a remarkable growth in outward FDI. Its outward FDI accounted for almost 55 per cent of the world outward FDI in 2005.
In contrast, while the labour markets in both the US and Japan are highly decentralised, their importance as a source of outward FDI have declined considerably in the past two decades by 24 per cent and 15 per cent, respectively, and accounted for only 16 per cent and 5 per cent in 2005. 3 Further, our result of higher utility of the union under decentralised unions than under a centralised union also supports the move of several countries such as Sweden, Australia, the former West Germany, Italy, the UK and the USA towards a more decentralised unionisation structure, as shown in Katz (1993) . The OECD Jobs Study also recommends making the wages and labour costs more flexible to 3 reflect local conditions (OECD, 1996, p. 15 However, unlike those two papers, we consider the effects of different types of unionisation on FDI and the union utility, thus addressing a completely different issue.
Further, unlike Skaksen and Sorensen (2001) which determine whether home workers and the firm agree if the firm should undertake FDI, we examine whether both parties share the same preference toward the unionisation structure.
Previously, Leahy and Montagna (2000) also show the effects of centralised and decentralised labour unions in presence of inward FDI. However, our paper differs from theirs in several important ways. First, we consider outward FDI from a country with unionised labour market, while they consider FDI into a country with a unionised labour 4 market. Hence, FDI in their analysis increases the number of firms in the unionised labour market, while in our analysis it reduces the number of firms in the unionised labour market, and may have different implications for the equilibrium outcomes. In a comparable situation to ours (i.e., for symmetric firms and product market competition), their analysis suggests that the wage rates charged by the labour unions are lower under decentralised unions. In contrast, we show that the wage rate charged by the labour union may be higher under decentralised unions when the incentive for outward FDI is higher under a centralised union, and if the number of firms undertaking FDI is higher under a centralised union than under decentralised unions. Secondly, unlike the present paper, they do not consider the effects of unionisation structure on the union utility. Thirdly, they ignore exporting as an alternative to FDI and assume that the alternative payoff to FDI as an exogenous variable, thus ignoring the wage determination problem under exporting, whereas we consider both exporting and FDI, and therefore, the payoff alternative to FDI is endogenous in our analysis. Finally, while we consider multiple firms deciding on FDI and exporting, and endogenously determine the equilibrium number of firms undertaking FDI, they consider a single firm deciding on FDI and exporting, thus ignoring competition between the firms undertaking FDI and exporting.
More generally, the present paper is related to the literature on FDI in unionised labour market (Bughin and Vannini, 1995 , Zhao, 1995 , 2001 , Leahy and Montagna, 2000 , Skasen and Sorensen, 2001 , Naylor and Santoni, 2003 , Lommerud et al., 2003 and Ishida and Matsushima, 2005 . 5 However, the present paper generally differs from the 5 existing literature in at least two important ways. First, the existing studies consider a particular type of union structure rather than considering the effects of different unionisation structures. Second, unlike the present paper which determines the equilibrium number of firms undertaking FDI, the existing literature generally focuses on a single firm undertaking FDI.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 derives the equilibrium outcomes under different unionisation structures.
Section 4 compares the effects of decentralised and centralised unions on the incentive for FDI and union utility. Section 5 concludes.
The model
We consider a two-country model, which comprises of a home and a foreign country.
There are ) 1 (> n firms in the home country. These firms are denoted by firm i H , i=1,2,..n. There are ) 0 (≥ m firms in the foreign country, and these firms are denoted by j F , j= 1,2,..m. We assume that the firms compete in the foreign country like Cournot oligopolists with homogeneous products. However, the home firms can serve the foreign market either through export or through FDI. We assume that FDI by any home firm requires a fixed investment f .
We assume that labour is the only factor of production and the firms are symmetric with respect to the production technology. For simplicity, one unit of final output requires one unit of labour input and the cost of labour input is equal to the wage rate. We assume that the labour market in the foreign country is perfectly competitive, and the firms producing in the foreign country face the competitive wage rate f w , which is, for simplicity, assumed to be 0 . However, the labour market in the home country is unionised and all the exporting home firms employ labour from the labour unions.
Concerning the unionisation structure in the home country, which is the main focus of this paper, we will consider two types of unionisation structure: (i) a decentralised union and (ii) a centralised union. Under decentralised unions, each firm in the home country bargains separately with a labour union, whereas under a centralised union, all firms in the home country are organised under a single (or national) union, and face a uniform wage rate (Leahy and Montagna, 2000 and Wey, 2004) . 6 In the following
, refers to the union that is attached to firm i H under the decentralised wage setting.
We assume that the reservation wage rate in the home country is h w , and is equal to f w , i.e.,
. This assumption of
is made for simplicity and in order to emphasise the effects of trade unions on outward FDI incentives. In particular, in our analysis, no home firm has the incentive to undertake FDI if the wage rate paid at home is not greater than the foreign wage rate. Since the labour market is unionised in the 7 home country, the assumption
will certainly ensure higher wage rate in the home country than in the foreign country. Although it is possible that the wage rate in the home country can be higher than the foreign wage rate even if h w is either greater than or lower than f w , our qualitative results will not be affected due to the simplified assumption of
As in Leahy and Montagna (2000) and Haucap et al. (2004) , to show our results in the simplest way, we assume that the unions have full bargaining power. 7 We assume that the unions set the wage rate to maximise their utility (which is the wage bill in our analysis) and the firms hire workers according to their needs. Hence, we assume that the firms have the right-to-manage autonomy over employment as in the works by Bughin and Vannini (1995) , Vannini and Bughin (2000) and López and Naylor (2004) , to name a few.
We assume that the inverse market demand function in the foreign country is
, where the notations have usual meanings. We consider the following game.
At stage one, the home firms decide whether to export or undertake FDI. We assume that the home firms take decision on export and FDI sequentially. 8 At stage two, the union(s) in the home country determines the wage rate subject to the unionisation structure (i.e., centralised or decentralised). At stage three, all firms take their output decisions simultaneously and the profits are realised. We solve the game through backward induction. 8
Export vs. FDI

Export by all home firms
If all home firms export to the foreign market, the profit of each home firm is: , is the wage rate subjected to the type of union setting. In the following analysis, we will use the superscripts c and d to denote the outcomes under centralised and decentralised unions respectively.
The profit of firm j F is equal to:
( ) 
A centralised union
If there is a centralised union in the home country, the labour union chooses the uniform wage rate for the home firms. Therefore, the labour union in the home country chooses the wage rate to maximise the following expression:
The equilibrium wage rate is 
Decentralised unions
Under the decentralised wage setting, the i th union chooses its wage rate to maximise its utility. Therefore, the i th union chooses its wage rate to maximise the following expression:
9 The second order conditions for all the maximisation problems of this paper are satisfied. 
Maximising (9) 
FDI by k home firms
Let us now consider the situation under FDI by some home firms. Assume that k home firms undertake FDI and the remaining home firms export. Hence, the profit of each of the k home firms undertaking FDI and each of the foreign firms is
The profit of each of the remaining ) ( k n − home firms, who are exporting to the foreign market, is:
Given the wage rates, the equilibrium outputs of the firms are: 
A centralised union
Since a centralised union chooses uniform wage rate, it chooses the wage rate to maximise the following expression:
The equilibrium wage rate under a centralisation is 
c f ht
12
Decentralised unions
Under decentralised unions, the t th union, n k t ,..., 1 + = , chooses the wage rate 
The equilibrium wage rate charged by the t th union, 1,..., t k n = + , is 
13
The incentive for FDI
The incentive for FDI under a centralised unionisation structure
If there is a centralised union, FDI is profitable up to the k th home firm provided that:
and values increase, it implies that the gross profit differences between FDI and exporting also increase, thus increasing the incentive for outward FDI by more firms.
Similarly, under decentralised unions, FDI is profitable up to the k th home firm provided that: , and the condition n k > + 1 2 is satisfied, which implies that the wage rates in the home country is higher under decentralised unions than under a centralised union.
The above discussion is summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: (i) If all home firms export or the same number of home firms undertake FDI irrespective of the unionisation structure, the wage rates in the home country is higher under centralised union than under decentralised unions. (ii) If the number of home firms undertaking FDI is higher under a centralised union than under decentralised unions, the wage rate in the home country may be higher under decentralised unions than under a centralised union.
Let us now consider the effects of different unionisation structures on the incentive for FDI. We find that 0 ) ( ) ( , , , , , ,
for this is as follows. Given the number of firms undertaking FDI, the wage rate in the home country is always lower under decentralised unions than under a centralised union.
Therefore, if the k th firm exports, it faces a lower wage rate under decentralised unions than under a centralised union. If the k th firm exports, its competitors are as follows: m foreign firms and ) 1 ( − k home firms undertaking FDI, each with wage rate 0 , and ) ( k n − domestic firms exporting, each with a lower wage rate under decentralised unions than under a centralised union. Since the effect of a lower own wage rate under decentralised unions compared to a centralised union dominates the effect of the competitors' lower wage rate, the profit of the k th firm is higher under decentralised unions than under a centralised union, if the k th firm exports. On the other hand, if the k th firm undertakes FDI when ) 1 ( − k home firms have decided to undertake FDI, the wage rate of the k th firm is 0 , whereas the ) ( k n − remaining exporting firms' marginal cost is lower under decentralised unions than under a centralised union, thus reducing the profit of the k th firm under decentralised unions compared to a centralised union when the k th firm undertakes FDI.
Hence, the following proposition follows immediately.
Proposition 2:
There are fixed costs of FDI (viz.,
such that relatively more home firms undertake FDI under a centralised union than under decentralised unions.
In other words, Proposition 2 implies that the incentive for FDI under a centralised union is always higher than under decentralised unions.
Union rent
Let us now determine the impacts of different unionisation structures on union rents. To start with, we consider the situation where neither home firms undertake FDI irrespective of the unionisation structure. In other words, we consider the situation where the fixed
, and all the home firms serve the foreign market through exports. In this situation, the comparison of the union rents under centralised and decentralised unions gives us: 
Hence, the union is always better off under a centralised union than under decentralised unions if all home firms always export irrespective of the unionisation structure. This result is in line with the existing works such as Horn and Wolinsky (1988) and Davidson (1988) , which suggest that if the workers are sufficiently substitutable, they are better off under a centralised union than under decentralised unions, since the former allows the union to internalise competition between different unions.
Let us now consider the situation where not all home firms are exporting irrespective of the unionisation structure. 10 Given the result of the previous subsection, which shows that the FDI incentive is higher under a centralised union than under decentralised unions, we now determine the situation where neither home firms undertake FDI under decentralised unions but k home firms undertake FDI under a centralised union. Therefore, the fixed cost of FDI is such that
. In this situation, the comparison of the union rents shows that:
It is clear from (34) that, given
, as k increases, it is more likely that
<
. Hence, the workers are more likely to be better off under decentralised union rent; rather the positive effect of a higher wage rate under a centralised union becomes important. Thus, in this situation, the worker is better off under a centralised union than under decentralised unions. But, if the market is not so competitive (i.e., 19 n ≤ ), the loss of labour demand under a centralised union due to FDI dominates the higher wage rate effect under a centralised union. Thus, the worker is better off under decentralised unions than under a centralised union.
It should be noted that if the fixed cost of FDI falls below 1 , d
f , we observe FDI even under a decentralised wage setting. However, Proposition 2 suggests that the possibility of FDI by more firms is higher under a centralised union than under decentralised unions. This implies that labour demand in the home country due to outward FDI is likely to fall more under a centralised union than under decentralised unions. Therefore, the net effect of outward FDI on the union rents when we observe FDI under both types of unionisation structures will depend on the difference between the number of home firms undertaking FDI under different unionisation structures and the competitiveness of the industry.
The above discussion is summarised in the following proposition. 
Conflict of interests between the union and the domestic industry
As mentioned in Katz (1993) , though history demonstrates that the unions prefer centralised bargaining and the employers prefer decentralised bargaining, the parties' preferences are not always so clearly ordered. Furthermore, Katz (1993) argues that the unions may prefer firm-level bargaining than industry-level bargaining because the former gives them a power advantage. We will provide a different reason for the nonexistence of a conflict of interest between the firms and the labour union. We will show that if the unionisation structure affects the incentive for FDI, there may not be a conflict of interest between the firms and the labour union, and both the union and the domestic industry 11 may prefer decentralised unions than a centralised union.
Let us first consider the situation where all home firms export irrespective of the unionisation structure. As shown in Proposition 3(i), in this situation, the workers are better off under a centralised union. In this situation, we find that the domestic industry prefers decentralised unions than a centralised union, i.e.,
11 Note that we are considering the domestic industry, i.e., all the domestic firms together, rather than a particular domestic firm. It is possible that though there may not be a conflict between the domestic industry and the labour union, there may be a conflict between the labour union and a particular firm.
Therefore, if all home firms export irrespective of the unionisation structure, the labour union and the domestic industry reveal conflicting interests.
Let us now consider the situation where the number of home firms undertaking FDI depends on the unionisation structure. We will show that, in this situation, there may not be a conflict of interests between the union and the domestic industry. Considering the situation where no home firms undertake FDI under decentralised unions, while k home firms undertake FDI under a centralised union, the domestic industry is better (worse) off under a centralised union than under decentralised unions provided: i.e., considering the fixed cost of FDI as
, we find that the left hand side of (36) is lower than the right hand side. Therefore, in this situation, the domestic industry is better off under decentralised unions than under a centralised union.
The reason for the above finding is as follows. The firm undertaking FDI faces a lower marginal cost of the production, which helps to increase its gross profit (i.e., the profit including the cost of FDI). However, FDI by a firm reduces the profits of the remaining exporting firms by exposing them to more intense competition from the firm 
Conclusion
It is often argued that if there are highly substitutable workers, labour is better off under a centralised union than under decentralised unions. We suggest that this may not be true in an open economy with FDI.
We find that the domestic firms have higher incentives for outward FDI under a centralised union compared to decentralised unions. Concerning the wage rates charged by the labour unions and the utility of the unions, if all home firms export irrespective of the unionisation structure, the wage rates and the union utility are higher under a centralised union. If the number of firms undertaking FDI under a centralised union is higher than that of under decentralised unions, the wage rates and the union utility may be higher under decentralised unions than under a centralised union, and the comparison may depend on the competitiveness of the industry.
We also show that if the number of firms undertaking FDI is higher under a centralised union than under decentralised unions, there may not be a conflict of interest between the labour union and the domestic industry, and both the union and the domestic industry may be better off under decentralised unions than under a centralised union.
